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25 October 1962 25X1

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR: Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would consider a "top-level meeting useful" is designed to generate growing pressures on the US which, Moscow hopes, will deter direct US military intervention in Cuba and oblige the US to ease the quarantine on shipping. This call for a summit meeting, coupled with the diversion of Soviet ships away from the quarantine zone, underscores Moscow's present intention to rely on political maneuvers to forestall further US actions.

In his message to Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev sought to contrast Soviet and US positions by pledging that the USSR will do everything in its power to prevent the outbreak of war. He added that Moscow will avoid "reckless decisions" and will not allow itself to be "provoked" by US actions.

Khrushchev also sought to enhance the urgency of a heads-of-government meeting by warning that if the US carries out its announced "program of pirate action," the USSR would have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense against the aggressor." He said US "aggression" against Cuba would render a summit meeting "impossible and useless."

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**\*Cuba--Non-Bloc Reactions:** Official and unofficial expressions of support, sympathy, or understanding for the US position on Cuba--either overtly or privately expressed by government leaders--have by now reached an impressive volume from all parts of the world. Nations from which such expressions have recently been received are Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Iran, India, Thailand, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama. Among the very few nations or groups expressing open opposition to the US stand was the Algerian National Liberation Front, which termed the blockade of Cuba "an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of that country."

In response to a US request that governments prevent landings or overflights of Soviet aircraft carrying

military cargoes to Cuba, the Sudanese Foreign Minister said any Soviet request for military overflights or for transport flights carrying military equipment would be denied as would any request for "commercial" flights beyond Khartoum. Libya indicated it would not grant overflights to Cuba either direct or via South America. The Moroccan Foreign Secretary confirmed that a proposed air agreement with the USSR had not yet been signed and that his government would "try to do something." The Foreign Minister of Senegal stated that, according to a cabinet decision, Dakar would be closed for military use by either side.

The favorable reaction of the Argentine military to the Cuban crisis continues. The Argentine Chief of Staff informed the US Naval Attaché that two Fletcher-class destroyers could be provided for Cuban quarantine within three days. With more time, Argentina would also supply a submarine, a marine battalion with transport, and other units and men if necessary. The Commander in Chief of the Air Force has sent messages to his opposite numbers in other Latin American air forces and to General LeMay pledging readiness to participate in any joint measures necessitated by the Cuban crisis. The Chilean Air Force is reported to support the US position with enthusiasm. The preliminary reaction of the other services appears similar.

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\*Cuba-UN: In the United Nations arena, neutral nations during 24 October continued to seek ways of lowering tension over Cuba. A joint UAR-Ghana resolution requesting Acting Secretary General U Thant to confer with the principal parties concerned and asking those parties to refrain from actions which might aggravate the situation failed to win widespread support. During

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the late afternoon, following a USUN briefing of African nations, the Malayan ambassador stated he saw a significant change toward greater "realism" in African attitudes. He also reported this would lead to revision of the UAR-Ghana resolution, of which a second draft was being prepared. The UN Security Council debate consisted only of several expressions of support for the United States and a Romanian statement supporting the Soviet resolution condemning the United States. During the evening, U Thant addressed appeals to President Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev, and Cuban leaders. He requested suspension of the blockade, halting of arms shipments to Cuba, and a peaceful attitude on the part of Cuba itself. President Kennedy's reply to U Thant, despatched in the early morning hours of 25 October, has as yet elicited no reaction. Neutral representatives in New York, who consulted with their governments overnight, are reportedly planning to meet again about 0830 or 0900 hours.

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DAILY BRIEF

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COMMUNIST CHINA - INDIA BORDER AREA



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\*Sino-Indian Border: Fighting continues to spread. Chinese Communist troops reportedly have attacked at two new points, one in the North-east Frontier region and one in Ladakh. This increases the number of such actions to seven.

New Delhi, maintaining its position that it will not negotiate while under military pressure, has rejected Peiping's proposals for a cease-fire and negotiation unless Chinese troops are first withdrawn to the positions they occupied before they began their advance in early September.

[ ] Foreign Secretary Desai says the Indians plan to resist the Chinese advances, harass them during the winter, and drive them back in the following "months and years." He told Ambassador Galbraith that this would require arms on credit and that the Indian Government expects to approach the US Government on this subject in the next few days]

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Moscow has published the full text of the Chinese appeal for negotiations to end the border dispute, and Pravda on 25 October, in the first Soviet commentary on the issue, called for a resolution of the border conflict. Pravda carefully avoided endorsing either country's position but called attention to the "constructive" proposals made by Peiping. The editorial attempted to contrast the Bloc's willingness to settle disputes with US aggressive actions against Cuba. [ ] (Map)


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Communist China - France: Communist China has contracted to purchase 1.08 million tons of wheat from France, with partial credits of up to 18 months. Delivery dates are unspecified.

This purchase, the largest so far from France, brings Communist China's total grain contracts with the West in 1962 to more than 6.3 million tons. Total deliveries in 1962 may now reach last year's high level of more than 5 million tons.

The regime is still concerned over its food problem, despite the appearance of slightly improved harvests.

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Indonesia - Portuguese Timor: Indonesian charges of unfriendly acts by authorities in Portuguese Timor may signal the beginning of a campaign to justify eventual seizure of the territory.

The Indonesian news agency, Antara, charged on 23 October that Portuguese shore batteries had been firing on Indonesian coastal shipping and accused the Portuguese of inciting kidnaping, cattle stealing, and smuggling in the Indonesian half of the island. The agency asserted that Portuguese border guards had killed three Indonesians in the past ten months.

Portuguese Timor officials have expected an Indonesian campaign against them following settlement of the West New Guinea problem.

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In mid-October [redacted]  
[redacted] a small build-up of Indonesia's force on Timor.]

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Congo: [Leopoldville officials are again urgently appealing for US help to resolve the Katanga problem.]



[Adoula appears to believe that the West has softened its stand against Tshombé and does not intend to press him to reintegrate. Adoula will almost certainly postpone the opening of Parliament if he feels he will be overthrown.]

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

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The Atomic Energy Commission

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